Legal System

The legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a subsequent statute dealings with the same subject-matter there can be no implied repeal. If, in a subsequent constitute, Parliament chooses to make it plain that the earlier statute is existence to some extent repealed, effect must be given to that innovation just because it is the will of the legislature. (per Maugham LJ in Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of health 1934).We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament as it were ordinary statutes and constitutional statutes. Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed. Constitutional statutes may not. For the repeal of a constitutional Act or the abrogation of a fundamental right to be set up by statute, the court would apply this test is it shown that the legislatures actual not imputed, shaping or presumed intention was to effect the repeal or ab rogation?I think the test could only be met by express linguistic communication in the later statute, or by words so particularised that the inference of an actual determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible. The ordinary chemical formula of implied repeal does not satisfy this test. Accordingly, it has no application to constitutional statutes. A constitutional statute can only be repealed by pellucid words on the face of the later statute. per Laws LJ in Thoburn v Sunderland Council 2002).In the light of these judicial statements, discuss how (if at all) the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty may be said to have altered because of changes to the doctrine of implied repeal. dispense also the effect of increased secondary legislation, devolution, membership of the EU and espousal of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty